

Report on an announced inspection of

HMP Dhekelia

by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

4–7 November 2013

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Victory House
6th floor
30–34 Kingsway
London
WC2B 6EX
England

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Introduction

HMP Dhekelia is a small prison within the Sovereign Base Areas (SBA) of Cyprus. It is a unique facility in many ways. It is managed by the SBA police force and holds both short- and long-term sentenced offenders, as well as those on remand, and both men and women.

The British Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia comprise those parts of Cyprus which stayed under British jurisdiction and remained British sovereign territory when the 1960 Treaty of Establishment created the independent Republic of Cyprus. They cover 98 square miles, 47.5 around Akrotiri, the Western Sovereign Base Area (WSBA) and 50.5 around Dhekelia, the Eastern Sovereign Base Area (ESBA). Because they are run as military bases, the Sovereign Base Area Administration (SBAA) reports to the British Ministry of Defence in London rather than the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Nevertheless they are a British Overseas Territory with a civilian administration working under an Administrator who is Commander, British Forces Cyprus.

Jurisdiction issues overshadowed all the work of the SBA police force. There are no physical borders to the SBA but the police only have jurisdiction within the SBA areas. In many ways, all the prisoners held at the prison during the inspection were foreign nationals, in that none of them lived within the SBA, yet all had committed crimes within these areas. A prisoner 'escaped' in February 2013 while being escorted to hospital in the Republic of Cyprus, where the SBA police have no jurisdiction. Since then, there have been several such incidents, and one man was still at large when we inspected.

We found that there was a disconnect between senior managers and operational managers, and between operational managers and police officers, although there was a real willingness by operational managers to improve outcomes for prisoners. The complex needs of many prisoners clearly tested the resolve of staff at all levels of the organisation and the policies in place. In many ways, they had provided the force with a wake-up call.

New arrivals to the prison were treated well and staff were clearly focused on the need to keep them safe. Staff usually knew how prisoners were interacting and were aware of any tensions that arose; as a consequence, violent incidents were rare. All prisoners said that they felt safe from bullying and intimidation. We found evidence that self-harming behaviour was often seen by prison staff as manipulative and was dealt with through disciplinary processes, which was inappropriate. However, overall, we judged that outcomes for prisoners in relation to safety were reasonably good.

We judged that outcomes for prisoners were not sufficiently good in terms of respect. Remand prisoners were locked up for nearly all of the day without anything meaningful to do. They were not allowed visits. Women fared even worse. The prison had not held a female prisoner since 2007 but one arrived, on remand, during the inspection. She was held in the area also designated as the segregation unit, which was filthy, and she had nothing to occupy her there. No one had considered that she would have specific needs, different to those of the male prisoners.

There was a lack of purposeful activity for all. Prisoners constantly complained about being bored. Although staff had made attempts to provide long-term prisoners with gardening activities, they were not motivated. There were no assessments of education or training needs, and no workshops, education classrooms or structured activities.

Despite the recommendations we made at the last inspection about resettlement, important aspects of rehabilitation planning, such as help with finance and accommodation, were not offered and the development of partnerships between the prison and relevant community agencies had not been developed. There was a lack of basic structures to help reduce the risk of offending on release.

The SBAA needs to consider whether HMP Dhekelia is a suitable place to hold long-term prisoners, or any prisoners at all. The main role of the police is to provide public reassurance and community safety, and it has targets to reduce crime and bring perpetrators to justice. A consequence of these targets is likely to be an increase in the population of the prison. In our previous report in 2010, we recommended that the prison, as it was at the time, held a maximum of eight prisoners. Since then, another five cells have been built; these are of a standard UK police cell design, with no storage facilities, and only suitable for short-term use.

If the decision is made to keep the prison in its current form, it raises the issue of who should staff it. The mission of the SBA police is 'to protect and keep safe those who visit, work or live within the SBAs through effective and efficient policing that upholds the law, prevents and detects crime and brings offenders to justice'. Their staff are trained police officers, not prison officers. They would not, in other circumstances, be responsible for the long-term care and rehabilitation of offenders – their priorities are different.

Outcomes for the prisoners held at HMP Dhekelia have deteriorated since our last inspection – largely because the prison regime and facilities have not kept pace with a larger, more challenging population with a greater range of needs. I hope that the recommendations made by my inspectors will be seen as constructive, to improve outcomes for prisoners held, for as long as they are held. I look forward to receiving the Chief Constable's action plan in due course.

Nick Hardwick
HM Chief Inspector of Prisons

March 2014

About this inspection and report

A1 Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Prisons is an independent, statutory organisation which reports on the treatment and conditions of those detained in prisons, young offender institutions, secure training centres, immigration detention facilities, police and court custody and military detention.

A2 This inspection of HMP Dhekelia took place in the week commencing 4th November 2013. It was the third inspection by HMI prisons commissioned by the Sovereign Base Area Administrator. The prison was inspected against our published criteria and test of a healthy prison but with recognition of the unique context of HMP Dhekelia.

A3 All Inspectorate of Prisons reports carry a summary of the conditions and treatment of prisoners, based on the four tests of a healthy prison that were first introduced in this inspectorate's thematic review *Suicide is everyone's concern*, published in 1999. The tests are:

Safety prisoners, particularly the most vulnerable, are held safely

Respect prisoners are treated with respect for their human dignity

Purposeful activity prisoners are able, and expected, to engage in activity that is likely to benefit them

Resettlement prisoners are prepared for their release into the community and effectively helped to reduce the likelihood of reoffending.

A4 Under each test, we make an assessment of outcomes for prisoners and therefore of the establishment's overall performance against the test. There are four possible judgements: In some cases, this performance will be affected by matters outside the establishment's direct control, which need to be addressed by the National Offender Management Service.

- **outcomes for prisoners are good.**
There is no evidence that outcomes for prisoners are being adversely affected in any significant areas.
- **outcomes for prisoners are reasonably good.**
There is evidence of adverse outcomes for prisoners in only a small number of areas. For the majority, there are no significant concerns. Procedures to safeguard outcomes are in place.
- **outcomes for prisoners are not sufficiently good.**
There is evidence that outcomes for prisoners are being adversely affected in many areas or particularly in those areas of greatest importance to the well-being of prisoners. Problems/concerns, if left unattended, are likely to become areas of serious concern.
- **outcomes for prisoners are poor.**
There is evidence that the outcomes for prisoners are seriously affected by current practice. There is a failure to ensure even adequate treatment of and/or conditions for prisoners. Immediate remedial action is required.

A5 Our assessments might result in one of the following:

- **recommendations:** will require significant change and/or new or redirected resources, so are not immediately achievable, and will be reviewed for implementation at future inspections
- **housekeeping points:** achievable within a matter of days, or at most weeks, through the issue of instructions or changing routines
- **examples of good practice:** impressive practice that not only meets or exceeds our expectations, but could be followed by other similar establishments to achieve positive outcomes for prisoners.

This report

This explanation of our approach is followed by a section setting out background information to HMP Dhekelia. The background section concludes with the main recommendations that arose from the inspection.

There then follows four sections each containing a detailed account of our findings and against our Expectations: Criteria for assessing the treatment of prisoners and conditions in prisons. Recommendations, housekeeping points and examples of good practice are set out where appropriate in the main text and collated in Section 5.

Details of the inspection team and the prison population profile can be found in Appendices I and II respectively.

Background

- S1 The Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in Cyprus cover an area of 98 square miles. The bases consist of Akrotiri in the west (WSBA) and Dhekelia in the east (ESBA). Both are situated on the southern coast of Cyprus and are some 60 miles apart. WSBA abuts the Republic of Cyprus, whereas ESBA additionally abuts the Turkish controlled area and the United Nations buffer zone. The Republic of Cyprus territory separates the two divisions.
- S2 The Administration is the civil government of the SBA. Its range of interest is that of any civil government but many of its functions are carried out by Republic officials on behalf of the Administration under delegated powers. Functions directly related to the exercise of sovereignty and the fulfilment of the UK's commitments under the 1960 Declaration on the Administration of the Areas, such as the maintenance of law and order, are carried out by the SBA Administration.
- S3 There are approximately 17,200 residents within the total SBA: 10,000 Cypriots and 7,200 Service and UK-based civilian personnel.
- S4 The SBA Police provide a civil policing service in all of the SBAs, including the military garrisons and the RAF station. The Cyprus Joint Police Unit (the Royal Military Police and the RAF Police) has sole jurisdiction over military offences committed by service personnel within the garrisons and stations and other retained military sites outside the SBAs. Although funded totally by the Ministry of Defence, the SBA Police are an independent UK Police Service, with no connections with the Ministry of Defence Police.
- S5 The SBA Police is led by the chief constable, who is responsible to the Administrator. He holds the additional post of superintendent of HMP Dhekelia. He delegates the day-to-day running of the prison to a police inspector, supported by a police sergeant. They are both operationally responsible to the divisional commander for the ESBA. Neither of them has had any prison training, although some of the police constables who work at the prison have received 'in-house' training.
- S6 HMP Dhekelia is a small, multi-purpose detention facility. It was built in 1955 and, at the time of the EOKA disturbances, initially held detainees. It later formed part of a military camp. It was renovated in the late 1990s and had five new cells added in 2013, so that it now has 13 individual cells, including two that are used as a segregation unit or to hold women if needed.
- S7 In the past, it has had periods of being empty but in recent years this has not been the case, and the profile of prisoners has changed, with an increase in their average length of stay. At the time of the inspection, four prisoners were serving sentences of between two years six months and three years eight months; they had been at the establishment for 14 months. Two other convicted prisoners were serving sentences of two months and four months, respectively. During the inspection, a further four prisoners arrived, all on remand, one of whom was a woman. This number of arrivals within one week was unprecedented.

Main concerns and recommendations

- S8 Concern: There have been significant changes in the context within which HMP Dhekelia operates and in the population it holds. Limits to the jurisdiction of the SBA mean that the security of prisoners who have to leave the base on escort cannot be enforced. The prison has been unable to offer an adequate regime to the long term prisoners, remand prisoners and women it now holds.

Recommendation: There should be a fundamental review of whether HMP Dhekelia remains viable or whether alternative arrangements should be made. In the short term, urgent action must be taken to ensure prisoners at HMP Dhekelia can be held securely and that the regime and facilities in the prison enable all those detained to be held in accordance with international human rights standards and norms.

- S9 Concern: The needs of women at the prison had been completely overlooked. The regime for female prisoners (remand or convicted) was unacceptably poor.

Recommendation: Women prisoners should be treated equitably and according to their individual needs, with reference to international norms.

- S10 Concern: The prison regime was predominantly based around the needs of convicted male prisoners. We found many examples where outcomes for remand prisoners were worse than for convicted prisoners.

Recommendation: The regime for remand prisoners should be improved and reflect their unconvicted status.

- S11 Concern: There was no assessment of prisoners' education, training or work needs.

Recommendation: There should be comprehensive assessments of the education, training and work needs of longer-term prisoners.

- S12 Concern: There was a lack of purposeful activity for prisoners. Those that we met told us that they were bored and had little to do. There were no education classes and there was no organised work within the prison.

Recommendation: Purposeful activity for all prisoners should be introduced and should include the provision of suitable education classes and meaningful work.

Section 1. Safety

- I.1** Reception screening processes had improved but new systems to deal with the needs of prisoners on arrival had not been fully implemented. New arrivals were treated well and staff were focused on the need to keep them safe, but living conditions for newly arriving women were poor. Although there was no formal induction, prisoners were told what they needed to know and received reasonable support during the early days.
- I.2** There were no formal violence reduction policies but violent incidents were rare and informal measures were appropriate. All prisoners said that they felt safe from bullying and intimidation. The number of self-harm incidents had recently increased but was reasonably low. The management of individual cases was developing but crude and we found evidence that self-harming behaviour was too often seen by prison staff as manipulative and dealt with through disciplinary processes.
- I.3** Procedural security had improved but security intelligence systems were underdeveloped. There were good links with the local police station but the flow of intelligence into or from the prison was sporadic. Security arrangements for escorts out of the Sovereign Base Areas were seriously undermined by issues of jurisdiction.
- I.4** The use of formal disciplinary procedures had increased considerably. Records indicated that hearings were usually conducted fairly and that prisoners were given the opportunity to challenge the evidence against them. Some punishments were harsh, cellular confinement was overused and the withdrawal of visits and telephone calls in some cases was inappropriate. There were few incidents involving the use of force and they were usually managed appropriately. There was evidence that force was only used as a last resort. There was little use of segregation but conditions in the segregation cell were poor. **Outcomes for prisoners were reasonably good against this healthy prison test.**

Courts, escorts and transfers

- I.5** Prisoner journey times from courts and police stations were relatively short – usually less than an hour – and arrival times were rarely later than 7pm. New prisoners generally arrived at the prison one at a time, always escorted by Sovereign Base Areas (SBA) police officers. Handcuffs were used while prisoners were in transit but they were removed as soon as they were inside the prison. Because the SBA police had no jurisdiction outside the SBA, helicopters were often used for journeys to or from the western base area (see also section on security). Prisoners told us that they had felt safe during their journey to the prison and that officers had treated them well. The escorting police officers we saw were polite, respectful and clearly focused on the welfare of the prisoner in their care.
- I.6** Relationships between prison staff and escorting police officers were good. Information about prisoners was shared systematically and prison staff made appropriate use of it to inform initial risk assessments. Prisoners received adequate notice of escorts, which enabled them to contact friends and family. They were allowed to wear their own clothes and were given a meal before departure.

Reception

- I.7** On arrival, prisoners were taken to a small, comfortable reception room, where they were met by a reception police officer. Identity and warrant checks were carried out, and property was checked and booked in. Prisoners were asked if they understood what had happened to them before transfer and if they had any immediate needs. They were allowed a free telephone call and given a meal. However, there was no documented policy to deal with the needs of vulnerable prisoners, and most prisoners did not see professional health services staff on the day of their arrival (see section on health services).
- I.8** Reception procedures centred on a written risk assessment based on a simple questionnaire, which asked the prisoner basic questions about their medical history and how they currently felt. The completed forms we examined contained insufficient information and did not reflect the quality of interaction we observed between reception officers and prisoners. A more in-depth assessment form (the Assessment for the Rehabilitation and Resettlement of Convicted Prisoners – Part One), designed to gather as much initial information as possible about the prisoner and help officers to make recommendations to mitigate immediate issues, had been published but was not in use.
- I.9** The reception officer explained the basic prison rules and entitlements to the prisoner, and gave them a written copy. A professional interpreter was called in for prisoners who did not speak English, Turkish or Greek. This individual supported the prisoner throughout the reception process and explained the written information they had been given; a copy in the prisoner's own language was issued to them within a few days.
- I.10** Searching procedures were carried out sensitively by two officers in private. Strip-searches were rarely carried out.
- I.11** Following a tour of the prison, usually by the duty sergeant, new male prisoners were located in a single cell in the main cell block area. Women were taken to the small self-contained unit away from the main block.
- I.12** There were no specific first night cells for men but, if vacant, they were usually located in one of the two cells fitted with closed-circuit television (CCTV). In the case we observed, the prisoner's identified first night needs were dealt with effectively and staff were clearly aware of immediate risks as well as the possible anxiety associated with a prisoner's first night in prison. They ensured that prisoners understood how to access officers if they needed help during their first night.
- I.13** Conditions on the unit for newly arriving women prisoners were poor. The environment was stark, and cells were dirty and had not been prepared to receive prisoners (see also sections on residential units and women prisoners).
- I.14** As there was rarely more than one new arrival at a time, prisoners usually received an individual induction from officers on the morning after they arrived, which covered all they needed to know. Prisoner told us that they had received important information, including how to make an application and how to complain. However, there was no assessment of resettlement needs during the induction and little help for prisoners with problems relating to their recent imprisonment, such as employment issues or accommodation retention (see also section on resettlement).

Recommendations

- I.15** There should be a distinct policy to deal with the needs of vulnerable prisoners in reception.
- I.16** An in-depth assessment of prisoner needs should be raised during their first days in custody.

Violence reduction

- I.17** The population of the prison had grown since the previous inspection and the percentage of long-term prisoners had increased. Senior staff said that the prisoner profile had also changed, and that the number of individuals charged with violent crime had increased. We were also told that prisoners now presented more challenging behaviour than those in the past.
- I.18** The arrangements for dealing with antisocial behaviour were generally effective. The number of violent incidents had increased since the previous inspection but they were still rare, with two minor fights between prisoners in the year to date and no assaults on staff or prisoners recorded.
- I.19** There was good identification of potential incidents, and informal information sharing between prison officers, prisoners and managers was well developed. These less formal relationships, particularly between prisoners and officers, and the closeness of the environment were pivotal in identifying issues early and dealing with them quickly at a low level. All prisoners told us that they felt safe and free from intimidation. They said that bullying was rare and that they felt confident that staff would deal with any issues as they arose.
- I.20** There did not appear to be a need for complex violence reduction policies and procedures. However, written records and formal information sharing about prisoner behaviour were generally inconsistent and there was a lack of security-related information to facilitate examination and identification of patterns or trends.

Recommendation

- I.21** Written records and formal information sharing about prisoner behaviour should be improved and include security-related information to facilitate examination and identification of patterns or trends.

Self-harm and suicide prevention

- I.22** There was no safer custody policy, and managers and officers were not trained in the prevention of self-harm or suicide. The self-harm and suicide prevention guidance note, contained within the prison's contingency plans, described reception procedures, the use of CCTV and immediate action to be taken following an incident of self-harm or a death in custody.

- I.23** Officers routinely checked on all prisoners regularly throughout the day and there was evidence that they knew of their personal circumstances and were aware of signs of potential distress. Prisoners told us that they trusted staff to help them through a crisis and that they would seek their help if they needed someone to turn to with a problem.
- I.24** The number of self-harm incidents had recently increased but was low overall. There had been three such incidents in 2013 to date, all involving the same foreign national prisoner.
- I.25** There were no individualised care plans to help prisoners through a crisis and there appeared to be little support from health services staff, particularly mental health staff (see also section on health services). Officers did not regularly record the detail of the action they took to support prisoners and they were not encouraged to record their observations and share relevant information.
- I.26** There was evidence that self-harming behaviour was sometimes seen by prison staff as manipulative. On at least two occasions, a prisoner who had attempted to ligature had received days in segregation as punishment, partly because of what was described as 'disruptive behaviour' (see also section on disciplinary procedures).

Recommendations

- I.27** **There should be a distinct safer custody policy.**
- I.28** **Prisoner managers and officers should receive training in the prevention of self-harm and suicide and how best to deal with prisoners in crisis.**
- I.29** **Individualised care plans to help prisoners through a crisis should be introduced.**
- I.30** **Support from health care services for prisoners in crisis should be improved.**

Security

- I.31** There had been some improvement in the management of procedural security. A locking schedule had been introduced, prisoners were locked in their cells at night, searching arrangements were mainly proportionate and tools were secured appropriately.
- I.32** We found no obvious weaknesses or anomalies in the physical security of the prison. Regular checks and routine searches of perimeter fences and walls took place, along with routine searches of communal areas and activities buildings.
- I.33** Security instructions, described in the prison's contingency plan document, had been reviewed and contained reasonable arrangements for emergencies and also instructed tool and key security, visits, prisoner movement and use of force.
- I.34** Some elements of dynamic security were in place but the management of security information was poor. Relationships between staff and prisoners were generally good, and supervision on the cell blocks was appropriate. However, we were not assured that officers patrolled the grounds often enough and, although CCTV cameras were in operation in most areas, the quality of images was sometimes poor.

- I.35** There was no effective security intelligence system. Officers at the prison rarely submitted security information reports and security intelligence was not collated or analysed. Links between the prison and the police intelligence department, based at Dhekelia, had not been developed and the sharing of information was sporadic.
- I.36** Security arrangements for the escort of prisoners out of the SBA were seriously undermined by issues of jurisdiction. As the SBA police had no jurisdiction outside the SBA, they were unable to enforce the custody of prisoners during escorts into the Republic of Cyprus to allow prisoners access to necessary services, particularly medical services that could not be provided at the smaller medical centre at the military base in Dhekelia. This meant that they were unable to handcuff prisoners while out of area or to enforce their removal back to the prison (see also section on health services).

Recommendations

- I.37** **A system should be introduced for the written submission and analysis of security information.**
- I.38** **The quality of closed-circuit television images should be improved.**
- I.39** **Links between the prison and the police intelligence department based at Dhekelia police station should be better developed and the sharing of information improved.**
- I.40** **Arrangements should be made to allow the effective escort of prisoners to and from areas outside the Sovereign Base Areas.**

Disciplinary procedures

- I.41** Discipline procedures were governed by the SBA's Prisons Ordinance 1971, as amended by Ordinances 2 of 1985 and 14 of 2005. A list of potential charges was defined in this body of law and there was proper legal provision for disciplinary procedures.
- I.42** Formal disciplinary procedures had been used on at least six occasions in 2013 to date. Although this number was low, it represented a marked increase since the time of the previous two inspections, when they had not been used at all.
- I.43** Records showed that these proceedings were usually conducted fairly and that prisoners were given the opportunity to present their case fully. However, some punishments appeared harsh and cellular confinement was overused. We saw examples where prisoners had been segregated as punishment following an act of self-harm, described as 'disruptive behaviour'. The withdrawal of visits and access to telephones had also been used commonly as a punishment.

Recommendations

- I.44** **Punishments should be regularly reviewed to monitor their proportionality.**
- I.45** **Prisoners should not be punished for self-harming.**
- I.46** **The withdrawal of visits and telephone call as punishment should cease.**

The use of force

- I.47** A detailed policy statement on the management of violent prisoners had been published and there was an appropriate emphasis on anticipation and de-escalation. Incidents involving the use of force were rare, with two in the year to date. Both of these incidents had been spontaneous and involved the same prisoner.
- I.48** Written accounts of these incidents showed that intervention had been well organised and properly carried out, and the documentation had been completed correctly. Proper authority was recorded and senior staff had supervised the incident.
- I.49** There was no evidence that force was used unnecessarily or as a first resort when dealing with difficult and violent behaviour. We were assured that force was only used when it was reasonable in the circumstances and was proportionate according to the incident.

Segregation

- I.50** The cell set aside for segregation purposes was a stark, unfurnished room, with a plinth and mattress. It had no sanitation or natural light and there were ligature points. It contained a camera so that prisoners located there could be monitored by staff. Use was rare and lengths of stay were reasonably short. It had been used three times in 2013 to date following adjudications, for a few days on each occasion.

Recommendation

- I.51** **Conditions in the segregation cell should be improved.**

Section 2. Respect

- 2.1** *Living conditions had generally improved but communal areas were old and worn and some cells were poorly furnished. Conditions in the small women's unit which was also used as the segregation unit were unacceptably poor; cells were filthy, the cage-like exercise yard was grim, and communal areas were dirty and poorly equipped, and the regime was poor. Staff-prisoner relationships were reasonably good. We saw officers who engaged positively with prisoners but others appeared to have low expectations of prisoners and spoke of them in dismissive terms.*
- 2.2** *A brief policy statement on equality that included aspects of diversity had been issued but its content was not broad enough. Provision to deal with the needs of foreign national prisoners was reasonable. Although prisoners were allowed to have religious artefacts in their possession, there was no area in the prison for corporate worship.*
- 2.3** *The regime for remand prisoners was poor. They were locked in their cells for nearly all of the day with neither company nor occupation. They were not allowed visits and were not usually permitted to make telephone calls.*
- 2.4** *The involvement of the garrison medical centre in health care arrangements was a good initiative, providing clear governance structures and guidelines to ensure good clinical care for detainees. Prisoners had good access to all primary care services. Medications were stored securely but the recording of administration was poor. Mental health provision was poor. **Outcomes for prisoners were not sufficiently good against this healthy prison test.***

Residential units

- 2.5** The prison consisted of three separate single-storey compounds within a secure perimeter. All buildings were appropriately equipped with anti-climb wire around the edge of roofs. Prisoner accommodation was divided into two sections by lockable gates, with the staff office in between. The larger of the two contained 11 cells over a single landing and was used to accommodate convicted and remanded men. Communal landings and corridors were old and worn in places but clean and reasonably well decorated. Prisoners were expected to clean their own cells and the communal areas in the morning. Cleaning materials were provided and there were ample mops and brushes around the prison. Cleaning fluids were available on request. The two small association rooms were furnished comfortably but walls and carpets were grubby.
- 2.6** Five of the cells in the larger section had been added since the previous inspection. These were large and clean but poorly furnished. They lacked a table, a chair or a cupboard in which prisoners could keep their possessions. The older cells were clean and reasonably furnished. The air conditioning in communal areas and the use of gated cell doors at night to cool the cells had greatly improved the comfort of the environment.
- 2.7** The main landing areas were covered by closed-circuit television cameras. In addition, two cells were fitted with cameras and were used when staff had concerns about prisoners' welfare. Cell call bells sounded in the staff office and in the central control room, and were answered quickly.

- 2.8** The prison grounds were well kept and there was a vegetable garden that prisoners could help to maintain. They could make telephone calls every day but the telephone was located in the staff office and lacked privacy. Prisoners could also receive a reasonable number of incoming calls. Men on remand only had access to a small, cage-like exercise yard.
- 2.9** The showers were housed in a separate building close to the larger residential unit and were in good condition. The areas were clean, screening provided adequate privacy and prisoners could have a shower every day.
- 2.10** All prisoners were permitted to wear their own clothes and laundry facilities were good. Clothes were available for issue when required. There were no standard prison-issue clothes but emergency supply clothing was kept in case of need. Bedding and towels were washed centrally and prisoners were satisfied with the standard of linen provided.
- 2.11** Applications were dealt with effectively each morning by the duty sergeant.
- 2.12** The smaller residential unit, comprising only two cells, was used to house women prisoners, and sometimes men following adjudication. Conditions there were bleak. The small communal area was dirty and poorly equipped. There was no television, the small table was dirty and the hard chair was uncomfortable. Cells were dirty and not prepared for occupancy (see also section on reception). We found one cell toilet stained with faeces. The exercise yard for women was also cage like, small and stark. During the inspection, one young woman was being housed on this unit and initially had no access to the prison's garden or any of the other amenities, such as the kitchen, laundry or recreation room (see also section on women prisoners). After our intervention, arrangements were made for her to have access to these areas between 11pm and 12.30am each night.

Recommendations

- 2.13 All cells should be adequately furnished.**
- 2.14 Prisoners should be allowed to make telephone calls in private.**
- 2.15 Living conditions in the women's unit should be improved. Cells and communal areas should be clean, well decorated and furnished comfortably and a television provided. Women should have access to all the prison's amenities at a reasonable time of day.**

Housekeeping point

- 2.16** Association rooms should be kept clean.

Staff–prisoner relationships

- 2.17** Maintaining appropriate boundaries in a small setting remained challenging. We saw excellent management and leadership from senior staff (sergeants and the inspector) and a will to set good examples to staff and prisoners alike.
- 2.18** Most prisoners said that staff treated them reasonably well and that they were helpful and caring. Our observations reflected this perception and suggested that staff–prisoner relationships were good. We witnessed many officers engaging positively with prisoners, and there was evidence that they had a reasonable awareness of their needs and were interested

in their welfare. Staff responses to difficult behaviour were not over-reactive and there were examples where residential officers dealt patiently with angry prisoners in a calm and caring way, to good effect. However, a significant minority of officers appeared to have low expectations of prisoners and spoke of them in dismissive terms, describing them as an inconvenience.

- 2.19** We sometimes observed poor supervision, when officers did not regularly patrol landings or other communal areas during periods of unlock.

Recommendation

- 2.20** **The supervision of prisoners should be improved.**

Equality and diversity

- 2.21** A brief policy statement on equality that included aspects of diversity had been issued. Although it covered general anti-discrimination measures, it did not pay enough attention to the specific needs of minority groups such as older prisoners, those with disabilities, gender issues and sexual orientation. There were no clear systems to identify and take appropriate action to minimise all forms of discrimination or disadvantage, including the unconscious and covert forms of discrimination detected in processes.
- 2.22** There was no structure for the overall governance of all aspects of equality and diversity. Equality issues were not discussed in a forum involving managers, staff and prisoners. However, we saw prisoners being treated equitably and according to their individual needs.
- 2.23** Although some formal equality structures were weak, we saw some good practice, whereby staff, particularly managers, made efforts to deal with individual needs as they presented. For example, managers and staff established early contact with embassies and other government agencies to seek practical support for foreign national prisoners, such as obtaining materials in their own language. They had also pursued options for repatriation, taking full account of prisoners' wishes. Foreign national prisoners were allowed a free telephone call every week to their families and the prison had recently introduced Skype for prisoners who were unable to receive visits. There was also excellent use of professional interpreting services.

Recommendations

- 2.24** **There should be arrangements to identify and distinguish between the different forms of discrimination, including the unconscious and covert forms of discrimination.**
- 2.25** **A policy which pays specific attention to the needs of older prisoners and those with disabilities, gender issues and sexual orientation should be published.**

Women prisoners

- 2.26** Living conditions in the small women's unit were appalling, and made worse by the long periods that women could remain there, alone and with nothing to occupy their time (see also section on residential units). In addition, those on remand were not usually allowed visits and could receive only a limited number of telephone calls from their family.

- 2.27** We had grave concerns about the conditions for women prisoners, and seriously questioned whether they should have been kept there at all. It was disappointing that the plans we had been told about during the previous inspection to use a house outside the prison compound as a daytime base for women prisoners had not been realised (see main recommendation S9).

Remand prisoners

- 2.28** There was no separate unit for remand prisoners and their treatment was poor. The prison authorities had decided that remand prisoners were to be kept separate from all other prisoners, including other remands, so, apart from occasional short periods of exercise, they were locked in their cells all day and night, with no company and nothing to do. They were unable to receive visits from their families and friends and were not usually permitted to make telephone calls.
- 2.29** We were concerned that the lack of any predictable regime, association periods and contact with others was putting this group of prisoners at particular risk (see main recommendation S10).

Faith and religious activity

- 2.30** There was no area in the prison for corporate worship. We were told that the visits room could be used if required but the furniture there was fixed to the floor and we did not consider it to be a suitable environment for worship. There were no regular corporate worship sessions for any religion and there was no obvious reference to specific religious festivals.
- 2.31** Prisoners were allowed to have religious artefacts in their possession and told us that staff sometimes organised a visit by a minister of their religion, but such arrangements were ad hoc and not well publicised, apart from a list of religious ministers available to visit that was displayed in the visits room.

Recommendation

- 2.32** **Prisoners should be able to practise their religion fully, in an appropriate environment.**

Complaints

- 2.33** Prisoners were told how to make a complaint during their reception interview. They were clearly free to complain in writing to senior managers, and often did. Replies were prompt, respectful and dealt with the issue at hand. Prisoners told us that senior staff tried hard to deal with the issues raised and regularly met them personally, to explain outcomes.
- 2.34** There was no formal monitoring of the frequency or nature of complaints, and no information about how to submit a complaint was advertised around the prison.
- 2.35** Lower-level complaints were dealt with quickly by either the sergeant or the prison inspector on the day they were made.

Recommendations

- 2.36** Formal systems to monitor the number and nature of complaints should be introduced.
- 2.37** The complaints procedure should be better advertised on residential units.

Legal rights

- 2.38** Prisoners were able to contact legal representatives by telephone at the expense of the prison. Such calls were limited to particular times of the day, at the request of the legal firms. Prisoners had no complaints about access to legal services.
- 2.39** There was a policy requiring legal correspondence to be treated as confidential but there was no system for marking envelopes as privileged. However, prisoners had no complaints about staff inappropriately reading their legal correspondence.

Health services

- 2.40** There had been no health needs assessment. Primary health services were provided by the medical reception station (MRS) at the Dhekelia Garrison, although there was no formal Service Level Agreement. There was a detailed draft protocol for the medical care of prisoners, which had been drawn up as a result of a working group set up to review aspects of the management and administration of the prison. This provided clear governance structures and was a good initiative.
- 2.41** The protocol identified several issues, such as the procedure to be followed if a prisoner required emergency care, the maintenance of clinical records and the management of prisoners who refused food or fluids – the latter as a direct result of several cases in recent months. However, it did not refer to the specific needs of women.
- 2.42** The GP, based at the garrison, had received no training in prison health, although had received training in preparation for working in Afghanistan.
- 2.43** An office in the administration block had been assigned as the medical room. It contained a couch and a desk but no hand-washing facilities. Staff from the MRS brought all the necessary clinical equipment with them. There were first-aid kits in the prison but none was adequate for the population. The kit in the staff area near the prison cells was dirty and contained only a few plasters, and no one checked the kits.
- 2.44** Prisoners' clinical records were held on the military electronic clinical information system (DMCIP), although there were also hard-copy notes in the main prison office. In the past, the latter had been the sole record of clinical care but now, in order to ensure clinical confidentiality, they served only as a conduit for brief instructions to the police and for the recording of the administration of medications.
- 2.45** Although the draft protocol stated that all prisoners should be assessed by a health professional before their detention, not all prisoners were seen on arrival. If they had received a health evaluation in police custody within the previous few days to be assessed as 'fit to detain', it was usually assumed that they did not need to be seen again. If they had not been seen previously, arrangements were made for them to be taken to the MRS for an assessment but this did not necessarily take place on the day they arrived at the prison. The

reception assessment was rudimentary and did not consider the offence or mental health issues; it was also not adapted for the specific needs of women.

- 2.46** Hepatitis B vaccinations were not routinely offered or provided to prisoners, despite World Health Organization guidance.
- 2.47** During the inspection, the first weekly GP clinic at the prison took place. This had been introduced in an attempt to reduce the number of ad hoc prisoner attendances at the MRS. The clinic was only scheduled to last an hour, with three appointments per week. Women were not told that they could see a female GP. Although staff said that, if necessary, a female GP could be found, we were also told that it was not a specific requirement of the MRS to have a female doctor as part of the staffing complement.
- 2.48** Prisoners had access to primary care services such as physiotherapy and dentistry at the MRS following referral from the GP. Optical services were also available through a private contract with an optician.
- 2.49** Out of hours, prisoners could be taken to the MRS or an ambulance from the MRS would attend in an emergency.
- 2.50** Since the closure of the hospital in RAF Akrotiri in November 2012, prisoners requiring secondary care had been taken to the Ygia Polyclinic in Limassol, in the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). This caused issues for the SBA police as they had no jurisdiction in the RoC, so were not able to use any means of force, including handcuffs, on any prisoner that they were escorting (see also section on security). As a result, there had been several escapes during hospital escorts.
- 2.51** Medications management was poor. Medications prescribed by the GP were stored in the relevant prisoner's locker, for which staff held the key. However, the medication administration charts, which indicated the medication administration times, were held in the main prison office as part of the clinical records (see above). When staff administered a medication, they telephoned the staff member in the main office to notify them and the latter staff member signed the administration chart. We spoke to a member of staff who was adamant that he had administered a medication on the previous evening, and that he had called the office to report this, but there was no record on the administration chart, so this system was clearly unsatisfactory. If a prisoner declined a medication, the reasons were not recorded, so it was not possible to identify why doses of medications had been omitted.
- 2.52** Mental health provision was poor. We met prisoners with clear mental health issues who were not being managed or regularly reviewed. There was no consultant psychiatrist available to the garrison, or by default to the prison. Community psychiatric nurses had seen some of the prisoners but their involvement was sporadic and did not meet the needs of prisoners. It was concerning to note that the prison was designated as a mental health hospital, under the SBA Mental Hospitals (Appointment) Proclamation 2013, which was clearly inappropriate.
- 2.53** There were no services for substance misusers, although the use of illegal drugs and the abuse of alcohol were not seen to be major issues in Cyprus. Staff told us that they would refer any prisoner who showed signs of detoxification to the MRS.

Recommendations

- 2.54** **There should be a health needs assessment and a clear Service Level Agreement between the prison and the garrison that details the services provided. There**

should be other Service Level Agreements as required to ensure that the full range of health needs, including mental health, are catered for.

- 2.55 Hand-washing facilities should be provided in the medical room.**
- 2.56 All prisoners arriving at the establishment should be subject to a comprehensive health screening, including their mental health needs.**
- 2.57 All prisoners should be offered hepatitis B vaccinations.**
- 2.58 All medication administration, including refusal of medication by prisoners, should be recorded by the person who administers it.**
- 2.59 Prisoners with mental health issues should be recognised and supported both by prison and health services staff and have unhindered access to help in pursuing their recovery.**
- 2.60 The establishment should not be used as a mental health hospital.**

Housekeeping point

- 2.61 All first-aid kits should be adequate to reflect the potential needs of all prisoners. Kits should be subject to regular, documented checks.**

Catering

- 2.62 Prisoners' meals were prepared at the Dhekelia military base and transported to the prison in insulated containers. Lunch and dinner were selected every day from an extensive menu of hot and cold meals. There was a variety of healthy options, which included portions of fruit and vegetables at every meal. A cooked breakfast was offered every day.**
- 2.63 The quality of the food we tasted was very good and at the correct temperature. The menus we saw met the needs of various diets, including vegetarian, vegan and halal.**
- 2.64 Convicted men were usually able to cook and prepare some of their own food in a small kitchen adjacent to the main cell block, although facilities there were poor. During the inspection, the cooker was broken and there was inadequate storage space, particularly for fresh and frozen foods. Remand and women prisoners were not allowed to use the kitchen.**

Recommendations

- 2.65 Conditions in the prisoners' kitchen should be improved. Enough cupboard space should be provided and the cooker should be in working order.**
- 2.66 All prisoners should have the opportunity to use the prison kitchen.**

Section 3. Purposeful activity

- 3.1** *Time out of cell for convicted prisoners was good, but for those on remand was poor. Although some recreational activities were adequate, the provision of purposeful activity, particularly for longer-stay prisoners, was extremely poor. There were no assessments of education or training needs, and no workshops, education classrooms or structured activities. Library provision was also poor. **Outcomes for prisoners (especially long-term prisoners) was poor.***

Time out of cell

- 3.2** Convicted prisoners spent from 8am until 11pm out of their cells. Time out of cell for remanded male prisoners was poor, at about an hour each day (see also section on remand prisoners).
- 3.3** Convicted prisoners had excellent access to the well-kept prison garden but there were limited recreational facilities available. There was a large recreation room, equipped with a table tennis table and four computers, giving prisoners access to a limited number of old electronic games. There was also a fitness room that was reasonably well equipped.
- 3.4** Access to the fresh air for convicted prisoners was unlimited during periods of unlock but for remand prisoners was restricted to occasional, unspecified periods in a small caged exercise yard (see also section on residential units), when staff had the time to supervise them. We calculated that remand prisoners could usually access the yard about four times a day, for about 15 minutes at each session.

Education training and employment

- 3.5** There were no formal assessments of education or training needs, even though about 25% of the prison population were long-term prisoners (see main recommendation S11). There were no classrooms or training facilities, and no specialist staff were employed to support, teach or instruct prisoners. The informal recreational classes that had been offered previously were no longer run and, although prisoners could do some gardening in the grounds, it was unsupervised and provided little opportunity for prisoners to develop useful skills.
- 3.6** There was no initial assessment of work skills. The range of available work was inadequate, being restricted to domestic cleaning and voluntary gardening. There was no vocational training and no opportunity for prisoners to gain any qualifications or transferable skills. In theory, convicted prisoners were required to work and remand prisoners could work if they wished to; in reality, no one did.
- 3.7** All of the prisoners we spoke to said that they were bored and were desperate for something structured to do. Staff felt that the level of inactivity, especially for longer-stay prisoners, was resulting in a rise in delinquent behaviour (see main recommendation S12).

Library

- 3.8** There was no dedicated library. A supply of paperback novels and magazines was available in the recreation room. Most of the literature was in English but there were a few in Greek and Arabic.
- 3.9** There were no-up-to date legal reference books and the prison's policies and procedures were not freely available. Staff sometimes offered their own newspapers and magazines to prisoners, and families were permitted to bring in reading material.
- 3.10** There was no visiting library service and no links had been developed with the garrison library to meet specific requests by prisoners. Prisoners were not allowed to access the internet, despite good levels of staff supervision at all times.

Recommendations

- 3.11** **The range of materials available in the library should be improved, reflecting the needs of the prison population, and newspapers should be provided at least once a week.**
- 3.12** **Prisoners should be allowed some supervised access to the internet.**

Section 4. Resettlement

- 4.1** *There was a lack of basic structures to help to reduce the risk of offending on release. Important aspects of rehabilitation planning, such as help with finance and accommodation, were not offered and the development of partnerships between the prison and relevant community agencies that we recommended at the time of the previous inspection had not yet been developed. Visits were managed flexibly and time limits were reasonable but remand prisoners could not receive visits. Outcomes for prisoners were poor.*

Strategy and reintegration planning

- 4.2** The published resettlement policy was out of date and many of its procedures had not been implemented. A strategy committee to steer resettlement work at the prison lacked an agenda to reduce the risk of reoffending. There was a clear need for systems to assess this risk and to identify and address criminogenic needs.
- 4.3** There had been an increase in the total number of prisoners at the establishment and also in the numbers serving longer sentences and convicted and held for violent crime. During the inspection, there were four remand prisoners charged with serious violent offences (including a woman prisoner), four long-term prisoners convicted of violent offences and a further two short-term prisoners.
- 4.4** There was no assessment of the offending history or risk factors of any prisoners. There was no sentence planning for longer-term prisoners, and the provision of offence-related interventions at any level had not been developed.
- 4.5** Prisoners' resettlement needs were not addressed at all before release and there was no procedure to identify the specific needs of prisoners in order to help them reintegrate into the community. There was no provision of temporary release.
- 4.6** There was no formal provision of specialist advice to help prisoners with accommodation or financial issues during their sentence and on release. Financial worries were common among prisoners, and at the time of the inspection at least one had particular concerns about how to continue to run his business while supporting his family during and after his sentence.
- 4.7** When prisoners were released, they were seen by a GP from the medical reception station. They were given a printed copy of their clinical records in a sealed envelope, but no further arrangements were made to ensure that they had continued health care post-release, if it was required.
- 4.8** The provision of visits for convicted prisoners was reasonable. They could usually have a visit every week. The visiting room was small but clean and well decorated. Visiting times were flexible and often adjusted to meet the needs of visitors and prisoners. Visitors could bring in food and drink and there was a snack machine that sold light refreshments. Prisoners could have clothing and some food items, such pasta and other dried goods, brought in. Relationships between staff and visitors were good. Staff were polite and respectful and put visitors at their ease.
- 4.9** Remand prisoners were not able to receive social visits (also see section on remand prisoners).

Recommendations

- 4.10 A resettlement strategy should be introduced to drive forward work to reduce the risk of reoffending.**
- 4.11 Risk assessments and a needs analysis for individual sentenced prisoners should be introduced, and interventions provided to address these risks and needs within a simple sentence plan.**
- 4.12 The resettlement needs of prisoners should be identified, assessed and met in order to help them reintegrate into their community on discharge.**
- 4.13 Temporary release should be provided for prisoners who are considered suitable, following a risk assessment.**
- 4.14 Managers should establish partnerships with community agencies that provide help on housing, finance and business, so that expert support is available to prisoners when needed.**

Section 5. Summary of recommendations and housekeeping points

The reference number at the end of each recommendation, housekeeping point or example of good practice refers to its paragraph location in the main report.

Main recommendation

To the Administrator

- 5.1** There should be a fundamental review of whether HMP Dhekelia remains viable or whether alternative arrangements should be made. In the short term, urgent action must be taken to ensure prisoners at HMP Dhekelia can be held securely and that the regime and facilities in the prison enable all those detained to be held in accordance with international human rights standards and norms. (S8)

Main recommendations

To the Chief Constable

- 5.2** Women prisoners should be treated equitably and according to their individual needs, with reference to international norms. (S9)
- 5.3** The regime for remand prisoners should be improved and reflect their unconvicted status. (S10)
- 5.4** There should be comprehensive assessments of the education, training and work needs of longer-term prisoners. (S11)
- 5.5** Purposeful activity for all prisoners should be introduced and should include the provision of suitable education classes and meaningful work. (S12)

Recommendations

Reception

- 5.6** There should be a distinct policy to deal with the needs of vulnerable prisoners in reception. (1.15)
- 5.7** An in-depth assessment of prisoner needs should be raised during their first days in custody. (1.16)

Violence reduction

- 5.8** Written records and formal information sharing about prisoner behaviour should be improved and include security-related information to facilitate examination and identification of patterns or trends. (1.21)

Self-harm and suicide prevention

- 5.9** There should be a distinct safer custody policy. (1.27)

- 5.10** Prisoner managers and officers should receive training in the prevention of self-harm and suicide and how best to deal with prisoners in crisis. (1.28)
- 5.11** Individualised care plans to help prisoners through a crisis should be introduced. (1.29)
- 5.12** Support from health care services for prisoners in crisis should be improved. (1.30)

Security

- 5.13** A system should be introduced for the written submission and analysis of security information. (1.37)
- 5.14** The quality of closed-circuit television images should be improved. (1.38)
- 5.15** Links between the prison and the police intelligence department based at Dhekelia police station should be better developed and the sharing of information improved. (1.39)
- 5.16** Arrangements should be made to allow the effective escort of prisoners to and from areas outside the Sovereign Base Areas. (1.40)

Discipline

- 5.17** Punishments should be regularly reviewed to monitor their proportionality. (1.44)
- 5.18** Prisoners should not be punished for self-harming. (1.45)
- 5.19** The withdrawal of visits and telephone call as punishment should cease. (1.46)

Segregation

- 5.20** Conditions in the segregation cell should be improved. (1.51)

Residential units

- 5.21** All cells should be adequately furnished. (2.13)
- 5.22** Prisoners should be allowed to make telephone calls in private. (2.14)
- 5.23** Living conditions in the women's unit should be improved. Cells and communal areas should be clean, well decorated and furnished comfortably and a television provided. Women should have access to all the prison's amenities at a reasonable time of day. (2.15)

Staff-prisoner relationships

- 5.24** The supervision of prisoners should be improved. (2.20)

Equality and diversity

- 5.25** There should be arrangements to identify and distinguish between the different forms of discrimination, including the unconscious and covert forms of discrimination. (2.24)
- 5.26** A policy which pays specific attention to the needs of older prisoners and those with disabilities, gender issues and sexual orientation should be published. (2.25)

Faith and religious activity

- 5.27** Prisoners should be able to practise their religion fully, in an appropriate environment. (2.32)

Complaints

- 5.28** Formal systems to monitor the number and nature of complaints should be introduced. (2.36)
- 5.29** The complaints procedure should be better advertised on residential units. (2.37)

Health services

- 5.30** There should be a health needs assessment and a clear Service Level Agreement between the prison and the garrison that details the services provided. There should be other Service Level Agreements as required to ensure that the full range of health needs, including mental health, are catered for. (2.54)
- 5.31** Hand-washing facilities should be provided in the medical room. (2.55)
- 5.32** All prisoners arriving at the establishment should be subject to a comprehensive health screening, including their mental health needs. (2.56)
- 5.33** All prisoners should be offered hepatitis B vaccinations. (2.57)
- 5.34** All medication administration, including refusal of medication by prisoners, should be recorded by the person who administers it. (2.58)
- 5.35** Prisoners with mental health issues should be recognised and supported both by prison and health services staff and have unhindered access to help in pursuing their recovery. (2.59)
- 5.36** The establishment should not be used as a mental health hospital. (2.60)

Catering

- 5.37** Conditions in the prisoners' kitchen should be improved. Enough cupboard space should be provided and the cooker should be in working order. (2.65)
- 5.38** All prisoners should have the opportunity to use the prison kitchen. (2.66)

Library

- 5.39** The range of materials available in the library should be improved, reflecting the needs of the prison population, and newspapers should be provided at least once a week. (3.11)
- 5.40** Prisoners should be allowed some supervised access to the internet. (3.12)

Strategy and reintegration planning

- 5.41** A resettlement strategy should be introduced to drive forward work to reduce the risk of reoffending. (4.10)

- 5.42** Risk assessments and a needs analysis for individual sentenced prisoners should be introduced, and interventions provided to address these risks and needs within a simple sentence plan. (4.11)
- 5.43** The resettlement needs of prisoners should be identified, assessed and met in order to help them reintegrate into their community on discharge. (4.12)
- 5.44** Temporary release should be provided for prisoners who are considered suitable, following a risk assessment. (4.13)
- 5.45** Managers should establish partnerships with community agencies that provide help on housing, finance and business, so that expert support is available to prisoners when needed. (4.14)

Housekeeping points

Residential units

- 5.46** Association rooms should be kept clean. (2.16)

Health services

- 5.47** All first-aid kits should be adequate to reflect the potential needs of all prisoners. Kits should be subject to regular, documented checks. (2.61)

Section 6. Appendices

Appendix I: Inspection team

Elizabeth Tysoe
Gordon Riach

Team leader
Inspector

Appendix II: Prison population profile

Status	18–20-year-olds	21 and over	%
Sentenced	1	35	2.2 / 77.8
Recall			
Convicted unsentenced			
Remand	1	8	2.2 / 17.8
Civil prisoners			
Detainees			
Total	2	43	100

Sentence	18–20-year-olds	21 and over	%
Unsentenced	1	5	2.2 / 11.2
Less than 6 months		29	64.6
6 months to less than 12 months		4	8.8
12 months to less than 2 years			
2 years to less than 4 years		4	8.8
4 years to less than 10 years	1	1	2.2 / 2.2
10 years and over (not life)			
ISPP (indeterminate sentence for public protection)			
Life			
Total	2	43	100

Age	Number of prisoners	%
Please state minimum age here:	18	
Under 21 years	2	4.7
21 years to 29 years	14	32.5
30 years to 39 years	15	34.6
40 years to 49 years	10	23.5
50 years to 59 years	2	4.7
60 years to 69 years		
70 plus years		
Please state maximum age here:	59	
Total		100

Nationality	18–20-year-olds	21 and over	%
British		1	2.2
Foreign nationals	2	42	4.4 / 93.4
Total	2	41	100

Security category	18–20-year-olds	21 and over	%
Uncategorised unsentenced			
Uncategorised sentenced			
Category A			
Category B			
Category C			
Category D			
Other			
Total			

Ethnicity	18–20-year-olds	21 and over	%
White			
British		1	2.2
Irish			
Gypsy/Irish Traveller			
Other white	1	29	2.2 / 64.5
Mixed			
White and black Caribbean			
White and black African			
White and Asian			
Other mixed			
Asian or Asian British			
Indian		1	2.2
Pakistani			
Bangladeshi		1	2.2
Chinese			
Other Asian			
Black or black British			
Caribbean			
African			
Other black			
Other ethnic group			
Arab	1	11	2.2 / 24.5
Other ethnic group			
Not stated			
Total	2	41	100

Religion	18–20-year-olds	21 and over	%
Baptist			
Church of England		1	2.2
Roman Catholic			
Other Christian denominations	1	32	2.2 / 71.2
Muslim	1	9	2.2 / 20
Sikh		1	2.2
Hindu			
Buddhist			
Jewish			
Other			
No religion			
Total	2	43	100

Other demographics	18–20-year-olds	21 and over	%
Veteran (ex-armed services)			
Total			

Sentenced prisoners only

Length of stay	18–20-year-olds		21 and over	
	Number	%	Number	%
Less than 1 month	1	2.2	20	44.5
1 month to 3 months			9	20
3 months to 6 months			5	11.2
6 months to 1 year			4	8.8
1 year to 2 years			1	2.2
2 years to 4 years			3	6.7
4 years or more	1	2.2	1	2.2
Total	2		43	100

Sentenced prisoners only

	18–20-year-olds	21 and over	%
Foreign nationals detained post-sentence expiry			
Public protection cases <i>(this does not refer to public protection sentence categories but cases requiring monitoring/ restrictions)</i>			
Total			

Unsentenced prisoners only

Length of stay	18–20-year-olds		21 and over	
	Number	%	Number	%
Less than 1 month	1	16.7	5	83.3
1 month to 3 months				
3 months to 6 months				
6 months to 1 year				
1 year to 2 years				
2 years to 4 years				
4 years or more				
Total	1		5	100

Main offence	18–20-year-olds	21 and over	%
Violence against the person		4	8.8
Sexual offences	1	2	2.2 / 4.4
Burglary		2	4.4
Robbery		4	8.8
Theft and handling	1	7	2.2 / 15.6
Fraud and forgery		1	2.2
Drugs offences			
Other offences		15	33.5
Civil offences			
Offence not recorded / holding warrant		8	17.9
Total	2	43	